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Abstract
We analyze artistic markets considering three key distinctive fea-
tures that have been overlooked by the standard analysis on intellec-
tual property. These features are the dynamic link between the cur-
rent number of young artists and future high-quality artistic creation,
Rosen’s superstars phenomenon, and the role played by promotion
costs. Introducing them into an overlapping-generations model brings
about a new perspective on the consequences for artistic creation of
changes in the copyright term, progress in communication technologies
favoring market concentration by stars, and the enlargement of mar-
kets. The conventional result that longer copyrights always stimulate
artistic creation only holds as a particular case.
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1 Introduction
Individuals are born with diﬀerent abilities. The process of sorting and
developing the abilities of heterogenous individuals involve diﬀerent mecha-
nisms. In most cases, much of the process is carried out through the period
of formal education. Education augments the skills of agents and helps
sorting their capacities (Becker (1964), Arrow (1973), and Spence (1973)).
However, some abilities cannot be ascertained without the actual job expe-
rience (Johnson (1978)). Some tasks where heterogeneous innate abilities
are important and only become apparent after some working experience,
involve occupations of large social impact. This seems to be the case for
example for politicians, artists, and, to some extent, scientists. Clearly, a
large endowment of talent or charisma is key in these activities, their output
involve some public good traits that give them a large social impact, and
the testing and development of abilities can hardly be achieved without the
individual being actually performing the professional activity.1
These circumstances pose specific problems to the sorting and develop-
ment of talent. Eﬃciency involves some optimal proportion between juniors
(individuals whose talent has not been fully assessed yet) and senior pro-
fessionals. The market may reach an eﬃcient allocation by having juniors
paying for the sorting and skill-development process in the form of command-
ing low or negative earnings at the beginning of their professional careers,
and being subsequently compensated by very high earnings if they succeed.
However, important market imperfections are likely to arise in this environ-
ment. Huge heterogeneity about innate abilities, which are uncertain to the
individual as much as to the rest of agents, may imply great uncertainty
about future earnings in professional careers requiring those abilities. Since
this uncertainty is uninsurable due to the combination of high eﬀort and
skills needed to succeed, and since the individual may also be liquidity con-
strained (due to the impossibility to use highly uncertain human capital as
collateral), the likely outcome in this setting is an ineﬃciently short supply
1Politicians grow in contact with the public, the media and the interaction with other
politicians within their own party as well as from other parties. Actors, musicians, movie
directors, etc. need to test their talent and charisma in contact with the public. Even
in academics, the actual talent for conducting original research is not clearly assessed by
tests used for admission in graduate studies but after having actually conducted some
research.
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of juniors. As noted, eﬃciency may also require negative prices for juniors’
work that may be diﬃcult to implement, and in some occupations (such as
the political career) it is unclear how a market for the promotion of juniors
may be implemented. Furthermore, senior professionals may be the ones
responsible for the access of juniors to the profession but may find it in their
own interest to restrict the number of juniors competing with them.
In this paper we concentrate on the particular case of artists and artistic
markets. Artistic creation (in music, films, writing, performing arts, fine
arts, etc.) is increasingly important as leisure time augments and societies
become more aﬄuent, and it is also connected to the ubiquitous good design.
The need for a correct understanding of artistic markets is underscored by
the public regulation of intellectual property (IP), which is a much debated
topic in recent years as a result of the emergence of new communication and
copying technologies, the globalization of culture, and the large diﬀerences
in regulation across countries. In this respect, some creators and artistic
producers are demanding tougher restrictions on the use of copying devices
(including Internet, CD and DVD recording tools) and have been obtain-
ing successive extensions of the copyright term in the US. Conversely, many
people including some very reputable economists and Nobel laureates have
suggested that the current IP protection is excessive in both the US and Eu-
rope (see Akerloﬀ et al. (2002) and The Economist, Jun. 21st (2001), Nov.
11th (2004) and Jan. 6th (2005). See also Liebowitz and Margolis (2003)
for a critical approach to this view, and surveys by Peitz and Waelbroeck
(2004) and Varian (2005)).
In this paper we emphasize three distinctive features of artistic markets
which have been overlooked by the standard analysis on IP regulation, and
which we argue are crucial for a better understanding of most artistic mar-
kets. Granting these features an adequate role in the analysis brings about
new and somewhat surprising insights on the optimal regulation of copy-
rights and on the consequences of progress in communication technologies
and the globalization and enlargement of artistic markets.
The first of these three features is the positive link between the current
number of young artists and future high-quality artistic creation. Innate
talent is central to artistic creation, but talent and charisma are rare and
not easily detected. Young artists need time and some share of the market
to be able to test themselves, to develop their abilities, and to show to the
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public and to promotion firms that they do have these characteristics (Mac-
Donald (1988)). This gives rise to a positive dynamic relationship between
the current number of junior artists and the future number of senior talented
artists. The abundance of young artists (most of which do not succeed) is
a precondition for a large number of high-quality artists in the future. Sec-
ond, there is a huge gap between young artists’ share of the market and
earnings, and senior high-type artists’. The reason is that artistic mar-
kets are superstar markets. In a celebrated article, Sherwin Rosen (1981)
showed that goods that are intensive in an innate input such as talent com-
bined with some characteristics that usually present in artistic goods (such
as scale economies arising from joint consumption), give rise to superstar
markets: concentration of output on those few sellers who have the most
talent, marked skewness in the associated distribution of income, and very
large rewards at the top. In principle, superstars’ large revenues seem to
prompt potential young artists to attempt the artistic career. Yet, as we
will argue, the very concentration of revenues by stars (combined with the
high uncertainty about success and the impossibility of obtaining insurance
against the likely event of failure) reduce the incentives to start an artistic
career. Finally, the third feature of artistic markets emphasized in this pa-
per is the important role played by promotion costs in shaping demand.2 In
particular, the allocation of market shares between stars and young artists
is largely aﬀected by stars’ hefty expenditures on marketing and promotion
costs.
Copyright regulation has been analyzed within the general approach to
optimal IP protection. According to this approach, optimal regulation in-
volves seeking a compromise between the social costs of the monopoly cre-
ated by the copyright and the incentives to creation. This conventional
approach takes for granted that stronger and longer term copyrights always
stimulates artistic creation.3 In this paper we argue that this is not longer
true when we take into account the interplay between junior and high-type
senior artists (stars). The monotonically increasing relationship between
2For example, according to several sources cited by Peitz and Waelbroeck (2004), mar-
keting and promotion are often the main cost of making and selling a CD.
3See Grossman and Lai (2004) and Boldrin and Levine (2006) for a recent debate on
the eﬀects of the enlargement of markets for the optimal regulation of copyrights, within
this conventional framework.
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longer copyrights and the supply of artistic creation only holds as one of the
possible cases in our model.
Our analysis is based on an ovelapping-generations model of artists. In
this setting, the long run number of active high-type senior artists may be
limited either by the revenues obtained by these high-type artists (which
must be at least as large as their opportunity costs), or by the flow of tal-
ented young artists (which in turn depends on the life-long expected utility
of initiating an artistic career and on the constraint that they must reach
enough audience to be uncovered as talented artists in case they do have
talent). Depending on which of the constraints is binding, the long run con-
sequences for artistic creation of changes in the economic environment (such
as length of the copyright term, communication technologies, size of market,
etc.) are diﬀerent. The case where high-type opportunity costs are the ones
binding roughly corresponds to the analysis by the conventional approach.
We show that high-type senior artists’ revenues tend to be the bind-
ing constraint for high-quality artistic creation when it involves very large
opportunity costs both in absolute terms and relative to young artists’ op-
portunity costs. When this is not the case, the binding constraint is the
flow of talented young artists. There are two main factors determining the
opportunity costs of high-type artistic creation. The first one is the degree
of specialization of the natural ability required in the artistic activity. As
pointed out by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991), there are diﬀerent sorts
of talent: on the one extreme, it may be highly correlated with generally
valuable traits such as intelligence, energy, social charisma, or leadership;
on the other, it may consist of a greatly specialized ability with no con-
nection with traits that are valuable outside the particular artistic activity.
Second, besides artists’ time and talent, creation of artistic goods may re-
quire the use of general inputs (thus having an infinite price elastic supply
from the point of view of the production of artistic goods).4 The financial
importance of these nonspecialized inputs widely varies from one artistic
activity to the other. For example, nonspecialized inputs may have a large
weight in the budget of a movie, whereas writing a novel may involve little
4By creation of an artistic good we mean the writing of a song or a novel, the making
of a movie or a TV show, etc.; as opposed to process of making the good available to any
number of consumers by means of copies or any other means, which involves a diﬀerent
sort of inputs.
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more than the writer’s time. When artistic creation is mostly the result of
general inputs and general intellectual abilities, opportunity costs are high
and therefore the constraint related to high-type artists’ revenues will be
the one binding. This case resembles very much the modern production of
technological ideas, and the corresponding results in this paper on the eﬀect
of copyright’s extension are coincident with the conventional analysis. By
contrast, when specific natural talent tends to be the unique input of artis-
tic creation, opportunity costs are low (this may be called the case of pure
artistic creation). We will show that the flow of young artists is then the
binding constraint. In this case, results substantially diﬀer from the stan-
dard analysis of IP regulation. The conventional approach to optimal IP
regulation has analyzed in a similar way the incentives to artistic ideas and
to technological ideas since both share the character of public good. How-
ever, this conventional approach is inappropriate where artistic creation is
mainly the result of innate specialized abilities rather than general inputs.
Our analysis concentrates on the determinants of artistic creation since
most of the debate on copyrights has focused on this variable (artistic cre-
ation will be just proportional to the number of active artists in our model).
Moreover, there is an open debate as to what extent advertising is infor-
mative or merely persuasive, and therefore welfare analysis becomes very
controversial when advertising expenditures are involved. As pointed out
by Sutton (1991, sections 3.1 and 14.3), the only well-established empirical
observation about advertising is that it is eﬀective in stimulating demand,
which is just the assumption we make in the model.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set out the gen-
eral elements of our approach. In Section 3 we consider the case where
the constraint limiting the flow of talented young artists is young artists’
opportunities to reach enough audience (these opportunities play the role
of the number of positions for junior professionals). This case allows us to
start laying out the model in its simplest version while characterizing some
relevant situations. In Section 4 we consider the more complex interplay
between young artists’ and high-type senior artists’ opportunity costs. In
both sections we analyze the consequences for artistic creation of changes in
the copyright term and of progress in communication technologies favoring
market concentration by stars. In Section 4 we also investigate how the
copyright term that maximizes artistic creation in the long run changes in
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face of increases in market size and technological progress. In Section 5 we
draw some final comments.
2 General Setting
Our approach relies on a overlapping generations model of artists who live
for two periods, and who may or may not have talent. Each period every
artist creates a single artistic work (such as a song, novel, movie, TV show,
etc.) which can be made available to any number of consumers at a constant
marginal cost c. MacDonald (1988) has analyzed in this type of setting how
artists with heterogeneous and uncertain talent are sorted by the market
through an information accumulation process. Assuming that future per-
formance is correlated with past performance (possibly because of innate
talent) he shows that individuals will enter the artistic career only when
young, and stay only if they receive a good review of their performance in
this first period of life. If this happens, their performances in their second
life-period are attended by a larger number of consumers who pay higher
prices (i.e., they have become stars whose earnings are more than propor-
tional to their uncovered talent).
Our setting is similar to MacDonald’s model, though we will not go
trough all the details of the information updating process in order to con-
centrate on a diﬀerent set of issues. We assume there is free entry into the
low-type market of artists with uncertain talent. Following McDonald’s re-
sults we go on to assume that individuals entering the artistic profession do
so in their first period of life and call them young artists. Only a fraction ρ
of young artists are talented, but neither them nor artistic firms or the pub-
lic can observe this innate characteristic but after the artist has completed
her first life period and has been able to reach a minimum audience (e.g.,
number of readers, record sales, public attending her performances, etc.).
Only young artists that reveal themselves as talented in their first period
may find it profitable to continue their career in their second life-period and
become high-type artists. Non-talented young artists drop out.
Incentives and Opportunity Costs to Artistic Creation
As already pointed out in the Introduction, the long run number of active
high-type artists may be limited by: (i) the size of revenues accruing to
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high-type artists which must be at least as large as their opportunity costs;
(ii) the flow of young artists that are revealed as talented. This flow, in
turn, depends on the life-long expected utility for a young artist of entering
the artistic market, which must be at least as high as her expected utility
outside the artistic career; and on how many young artists can reach the
minimum audience (sales of books, records, etc.) to be able to be sorted as
a talented artist in case they do are talented.5 We normalize units by taking
this minimum audience to be equal to one. Formally, we have the following
three constraints where expression (1) corresponds to (i), and expressions
(2) and (3) correspond to the double constraint (ii):
πht ≥ Fh; (1)
1
1− σ [π
y
t ]
1−σ
+
nt+1
mt
θ
1− σ
h
πht+1
i1−σ
+
µ
1− nt+1
mt
¶
θ
1− σ [F
y]1−σ
≥ 1 + θ
1− σ [F
y]1−σ ; (2)
yt
1
mt
≥ 1. (3)
Where πh is (per capita) high-type artists’ revenues, πy is young artists’
revenues, Fh is high-type artists’ opportunity cost, F y is young artists’
opportunity cost, mt is the number of young artists at time t, nt+1 is the
number of high-type artists one period later, σ > 0 is the coeﬃcient of
relative risk-aversion, θ < 1 is the subjective intertemporal discount factor,
and yt is total sales in the low-type market of young artists.
As we already noted, which of these constraints will likely be the one
binding depends on the absolute and relative levels of young and high-type
artists’ opportunity costs. We will show that the case where (1) is the bind-
ing constraint corresponds to a situation where high-type artistic creation
involves very large opportunity costs relative to young artists’ opportunity
costs (and talent can easily be uncovered in a short period of time). In
this case, constraint (2) and (3) are not binding which means that there
is not shortage of young artists trying the artistic career and showing up
5We assume young artists cannot obtain insurance for the eventuality that they do not
become stars. This seems to be very plausible empirically and may be the consequence
of moral hazard and adverse selection problems. Becoming a star usually requires a
significant (nonabsorbable by third parties) personal eﬀort during the young-artist period,
even for those who have talent and charisma.
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as talented. The case where (2) is the binding constraint is somewhat the
opposite situation: young artists’ opportunity costs are similar to high-type
artists’. Even if high-type artists’ revenues are above their opportunity cost,
this does not bring about a large supply of young artists due to the large
uncertainty of success. Finally, if both high-type as well as young artists
have small opportunity costs but high-type artists concentrate most of the
artistic market, the binding constraint will be (3). In this situation, eco-
nomic incentives are not limiting the number of artists. The situation will
be that of a large amount of young individuals willing to become artists
but being unable to reach enough audience (even when commanding a zero
revenue for their work).
Entry and the Flow of Young Artists
Free entry as a young artist implies that young artists’ expected utility
in the artistic career cannot be above their opportunity costs. Therefore
constraint (2) must be satisfied with equality:
[πyt ]
1−σ
+ θ
nt+1
mt
µh
πht+1
i1−σ
− [F y]1−σ
¶
= [F y]1−σ . (2’)
High-type artists may obtain revenues above their opportunity costs how-
ever, since their number is limited by the number of successful young artists.
As already stated, a fraction ρ of young artists have talent. Yet not
necessarily all young artists that have come out with talent (and that have
reached enough audience) get promoted as high-type artists in their second
life-period. It may occur that nt < ρmt−1. This may happen if high-type
artists’ opportunity cost (1) is binding so that additional active high-type
artists would bring their earnings below their opportunity costs. On the
other hand, if high-type artists are strictly above their opportunity cost, all
young artists that come up as talented will become high-type artists in their
second life-period. According to these arguments the number of high-type
artists will be given by:
nt ≤ ρmt−1; (4)³
πht − Fh
´
(nt − ρmt−1) = 0.
9
Demand and Competition
Every period, consumers spend the same amount of money S in artistic
goods (we will refer to S as the size of the market). High-type artists enjoy
promotion and marketing costs that are provided by a competitive industry
of artistic-promotion firms.6 The assumption that promotion firms only find
profitable to invest in promoting high-type artists may be motivated by the
complementarity between promotion and talent, and by fixed costs. Given
the low probability of success, small fixed costs would lead promoting firms
to steak with artists whose talent and charisma has already been established.
High-type artists’ share of the market is an endogenous parameter depending
on total high-type artists’ expenditures on promotion, and is denoted by a
(0 < a < 1).
The setting may be interpreted in a spatial way. Young artists may be
thought to be local artists, whereas high-type artists correspond to interna-
tional artists. In every locality, the public buys both the output of their local
artists as well as the output of international artists (local artists’ work may
thought to be more influenced by the cultural peculiarities and experiences
of their geographic area or ethnic group). Local artists’ main mechanism
to get known is word-of-mouth, whereas international artists rely on ex-
pensive marketing and promotion. The fraction of income spent in either
type of artist in every locality depends on international artists’ promotion
expenditures. Dynamically, a fraction of local artists reveal themselves as
having universal talent and are periodically drafted by promotion firms to
the international high-type market.
Formally, we assume a representative consumer that solves the following
maximization problem:7
MaxU = a lnx+ (1− a) ln y, (5)
s.t. pxx+ pyy = S
where x and y are, respectively, total consumption of stars’ and young
6We ignore the possible bargaining problem between artists and promotion firms and
just focus on the forces explaining the profits of the integrated structure. The potential
conflicts of interest between these two parties have been analyzed in Gayer and Shy (2006).
Similarly, we also leave aside the possibility that the market of promotion firms is not
competitive.
7 In the spatial interpretation, the model may be reformulated as with c symmetric
local markets each one with size (1− a)S, and one international market with size c·a·S.
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artists’ work,8 px and py are the corresponding prices, and the market share
a is determined according to the following expression:
a = α− βe−γA/S , A =
nX
i
Ai, Ai ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, .., n . (6)
In this expression, α, β and γ are exogenous parameters, 1 > α > β > 0,
γ > 1, Ai is advertising and promotion cost by artist i, and n (n ≥ 2) is the
number of high-type artists. This formulation implies that the amount of
promotion costs needed to obtain a given share of the market is proportional
to the size S of the market.9 High-type artists’ market share would be α
for A = ∞, and α − β for zero promotion expenditures. The parameter γ
determines how productive promotion costs are in gaining market share.
Competition takes place according to the following multistage game:
• Stage 1: Each high-type artist chooses simultaneously, and indepen-
dently, its level of Ai.
• Stage 2: Each young artist decides whether or not to enter the artistic
market.
• Stage 3: Agents compete à la Cournot.
8Two-stage budgeting and the Cobb-Douglas formulation greatly simplify calculations.
Should we use a more general CES utility function, results would only change but con-
tinuously as a function of the elasticity of substitution. Thus, all the results would be
maintained within this more general setting for at least some range of the elasticity of
substitution. On the other hand, it may be more interesting to reinterpret this formula-
tion as coming from a continuum of consumers of size S each consuming a unit of money
in artistic goods, and such that the share of consumers buying either from stars or from
young artists depends on total promotion expenditures.
9A firm’s advertising tends to increase both the demand for the firm’s specific good and
the overall demand for the type of good being advertised. As a result, advertising increases
the share of this type of good in consumers’ expenditure (Sutton, 1991). In our formulation
we model advertising as a public good for high-type firms, ignoring the competitive eﬀects
of advertising within high-type firms and focussing on the aggregate interactions between
the low and the high-type sub-markets. We also leave aside the existence of horizontal
diﬀerentiation among artists belonging to the same sub-market. Preferences for diversity
could be easily introduced, however, by assuming that variables x and y are aggregates of
the type assumed by Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), which tend to produce
results equivalent to models of homogeneous products (Yarrow, 1985).
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Note that the parameters α and γ depend on technological progress.
Rosen (1981) pointed out the importance that radio and phonograph records
had for the market of superstars and wondered about the changes that will
be brought by cable, video cassettes, and home computers. The path of
technological changes in this industry does not seem to have slowed down
in recent years when new devices and quality improvements have been in-
troduced. The possibility that top artists are able to reach millions of con-
sumers across the world is the consequence of technical improvements (such
as recording, radio, TV, etc.), the increasing availability of electronic de-
vices rising quality and decreasing price, and the opening of frontiers to
foreign cultural influences which has been spectacular in recent years for
many countries. Changes in parameters α and γ may capture the eﬀect
of changes on the potential market that stars might reach and the eﬀec-
tiveness of the techniques aimed at increasing stars’ market shares (such as
marketing and promotion techniques).
3 Artistic Markets with Low Opportunity Costs
In this section we assume that the constraint (3) is the one binding. This
corresponds to a situation where young artists’ career is constrained by the
opportunities to reach enough audience. Since constraints (1) and (2) are not
binding and there is free entry, there will be a excess supply of young artists
who will be pushing the price of their services to a zero level.10 Clearly, for
this to happen expected returns in case of success must be very high, so that
young artists’ life-long expected revenues are above their opportunity costs
even for πy = 0.11 Economic incentives are not constraining artistic careers
in any way; the problem is having some room in the market to show up.12
This might be considered a rather extreme case, but it will allow to start
10We exclude the possibility that young musicians, writers, actors, film directors, etc.,
pay to have some audience consuming their work (i.e., we exclude negative prices for their
work).
11See Appendix B which builds on the analysis in the next section for the conditions
as to (1) and (2) not to be binding. Low opportunity costs are more likely to occur
when young artists are able to participate in the low-type artistic market while obtaining
revenues from a simultaneous non-artistic job (which often seems the case for prospective
writers and pop musicians).
12An additional element that we have not been introduced in our model which would
lead to a similar constraint on young artists’ audience is a limit on the number of artistic
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laying out the model in its simplest version and characterizing some relevant
situations. At any rate, the analysis in the next section is independent of
the results in this section.
3.1 The Short Run Number of Young Artists
We now solve for every period (short run) equilibrium taking the number
of high-type artists as exogenous. This serves as a first step to the dynamic
analysis in the next subsection. The exogeneity of the number of high-type
artists in the short run reflects the idea that the group of stars keep changing
with lower frequency than the group of young artists.
Let us consider the Cournot-Nash equilibrium at Stage 3. Standard
calculations show that the demand functions for each good are given by
px = aS/x; and py = (1 − a)S/y . Thus, the profit function of each high-
type (artistic) firm is given by
πhi (xi, x) =
aSxi
x
− cxi −Ai, i = 1, 2, ..., n.
where xi is the production of firm i and c is the constant marginal cost,
assumed identical for all firms. The first order conditions of a Cournot
equilibrium yield the equations
aS
x
− c− aSxi
x2
= 0, i = 1, 2, ..., n.
By solving the previous system we get the Cournot equilibrium levels of
price, output per firm and profits:
px =
n
n− 1c; xi =
n− 1
n2
aS
c
; πhi =
aS
n2
−Ai. (7)
Now, let us solve for the first stage to obtain the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium of the game. We can write the profit function of each high-type
firm as
πhi (Ai, A) =
(α− βe−γA/S)S
n2
−Ai, i = 1, 2, ..., n. (8)
goods (movies, concerts, books, etc.) consumers may consume per unit of time. Even if
young artists’ supply their work for free, consumers may limit their consumption of young
artists’ work and may want to spend a large share of their scarce leisure time enjoying
only high-type artists’ work.
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The first order conditions for a SPNE of the game yield the equilibrium level
for high-type artists’ market share a(n):
βe−γA/S
n2
− (1/γ) = 0 → a(n) = α− n2/γ. (9)
The inequality n2 < βγ is a necessary and suﬃcient condition to haveAi > 0.
Throughout the paper we always assume γ is always high enough to guaranty
this condition. It is easy to see that under this condition, high-type artists
always obtain positive net revenues. Now, assuming constraint (3) is binding
and py = c (since the excess supply of potential young artists imply they
supply their services at zero price), we have:
mt =
1− a(n)
c
S =
1− α+ n2t /γ
c
S (10)
As noted by Rosen, the development of some modern recording and
communication technologies may amplify the scale economies of joint con-
sumption associated to artistic goods and may tend to further concentrate
market shares and earnings on top talented artists. As we argued at the
end of the last section, some of the impact of improvements in communi-
cation technologies and the dismantlement of cultural frontiers helping top
artists reach larger audiences may be captured by rises in γ and α. Ac-
cording to equations (9) and (10), a rise in γ or in α would increase market
concentration by stars a(n) and reduce the number m of young artists.
3.2 The Long Run Dynamics
Since constraint (1) is not binding, (4) implies:
nt+1 = ρmt.
Using this to substitute in (10) we obtain the following diﬀerence equation:
nt =
¡
1− α+ n2t−1/γ
¢ S
c
ρ. (11)
Solving nt = nt−1 it is easy to see that this system has two positive steady
state solutions for γ [c/ρS]2 ≥ 4 (1− α) (i.e., for γ and c suﬃciently large,
or ρS suﬃciently small). The smallest n solving the system is the stable one
and is denoted by n∗ (see Figure 1). In the previous subsection we noted
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that the development of better communication and promotion technologies
may favor the concentration of market shares and earnings by top artists
thereby reducing the number of young artists. The next proposition points
out that, in the long run, rising market concentration is also negative for
high-quality artistic creation.
Proposition 1 When potential young artists are constrained by the oppor-
tunities to reach enough audience (i.e., for parameters such that constraint
(3) is binding), economic changes favoring market concentration by high-type
artists (such as improvements in marketing and communication technologies
and the globalization of artistic markets as captured by increases in γ and
α), reduce the long run number of young as well as of high-type artists.
To see this note that an increase in γ or α rises a(n) (equation (9)) and
shifts
¡
1− α+ n2t−1/γ
¢
Sρ/c downwards in Figure 1, thereby lowering n∗.
The reason for the reduction in n∗ is that low-type (or local) artistic markets
help testing, sorting and developing future high-type artists. Larger market
concentration by high-type artists reduces the number of active young (local)
artists in the short run, which in turn reduces high-type artistic creation in
the long run.
3.3 The Length of the Copyright Term
In this subsection we extend the model to analyze the consequences of chang-
ing the length of the copyright term. We now assume that high-type artistic
goods are also consumed after the creator’ death. Utility provided by old
creations diminishes as the date of creation becomes more distant according
to a discount factor η, 0 < η < 1 (old artistic goods become less adapted to
current tastes). However, artistic work by unsuccessful young artists is lost
for good as the artist drops out from the market at the end of her first life-
period. High-type artists are able to capture the present discounted value
of the net earnings from future sales by selling their copyrights when they
are still alive.
To keep things simple, it is now more convenient to assume that con-
sumers live for only one period and that their holdings of copies of artistic
goods cannot be resold (or are useless) to other consumers after their death.
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The new consumer’s problem at any given period t is:
MaxU = (1− η)
∞X
τ=0
aτητ lnxτ +
"
1− (1− η)
∞X
τ=0
aτητ
#
ln y, (12)
s.t. pxτ
T−1X
τ=0
xτ + c
∞X
τ=T
xτ + pyy = S.
Where T ≥ 1 is the length of the copyright term, xτ is the current consump-
tion of high-type artistic goods created τ periods ago, pxτ is their price, c
is the already defined marginal cost which determines the competitive price
at which copies are sold when copyright expires, aτ = α − βe−(γ/S)Aτ , and
Aτ are promotion costs on high-type artistic goods created τ periods ago
(which were spent at the time the good release, i.e., τ periods ago).13
The analysis of high-type artist decisions remains almost unchanged after
this extension. As in the previous subsection, first consider the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium at Stage 3. Demand functions for each type of good are
given by pxτ = aτ (1 − η)ητS/xτ . Hence denoting by xτi firm i’s output at
time t which sells an artistic good that was created at period τ , the Cournot
equilibrium prices and output are:
pxτ =
nτ
nτ − 1
c; xτi =
nτ − 1
n2τ
aτ (1− η)ητS
c
;
where nτ is the number of high-type artists that were active τ periods ago
(and whose works are available at time t). Now, let us solve for the first
stage to obtain the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game. We
directly go on to solve for a symmetric steady state equilibrium: nτ = n∗ =
ρmt = ρm∗, Aτ = A, aτ = a∗. The following expression corresponds to a
high-type firm’s present discounted value of profits at the time of deciding
about promotion costs Ai:
πhi (Ai, A) =
α− βe−(γ/S)A
n2
S(1− η)
T−1X
τ=0
(ηR)τ −Ai, (13)
A =
X
i
Ai; i = 1, 2, ..., n;
13Our restriction that T ≥ 1 is equivalent to assuming that the minimum copyright
protection is given by the length of the young artistic period. Note that the current
copyright term in the US is the life of the artist plus 70 years.
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where R is the intertemporal discount factor. The first order conditions for
the SPNE of the game determine the equilibrium level of a:
βe−(γ/S)A
n2
w(T )− (1/γ) = 0 → a(n) = α− n
2
γ
1
w(T )
. (14)
where
w(T ) = (1− η)
T−1X
τ=0
(ηR)τ = (1− η)1− (ηR)
T
1− ηR .
Now, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for Ai > 0 is n2 < βγw(T ).
Clearly, w(T ) is strictly increasing in T (and it is bounded from above by 1:
we would have w = 1 for T = ∞ and R = 1). We will sometimes simplify
notation by interpreting an exogenous change in w as originated by a change
in T of the same sign (and with some abuse of notation we will be implicitly
taking T as a continuous variable). Since (10) holds the same and (4) is
binding, we obtain the following equation for the steady state:
n =
µ
1− α+ n
2
γ
1
w(T )
¶
S
c
ρ. (11b)
This expression is very similar to system (11). For γ [w(T )c/ρS]2 ≥ 4 (1− α),
it has two positive solutions of which the smallest n∗ is the stable one. Thus,
for γ, T and c suﬃciently large, or ρS suﬃciently small have:
n∗ =
w(T )γc/ρS −
q
[w(T )γc/ρS]2 − 4 (1− α) γ
2
> 0; (15)
where we are picking the stable solution. It is easy to see that for condi-
tions leading to a positive solution n∗ ≥ 0 we have dn∗/dT < 0. Graph-
ically, an increase in T raises w(T ) and therefore shifts downwards the¡
1− α+ n2/w(T )γ
¢
Sρ/c schedule in Figure 1. Therefore, extending the
length of copyright protection reduces low- as well as high-type artistic cre-
ation in the long run.
Proposition 2 When potential young artists are constrained by the oppor-
tunities to reach enough audience (i.e., for parameters such that constraint
(3) is binding), extending the length of the copyright term reduces the long
run number of both young and high-type artists.14
14 In Appendix B we set out to the conditions for constraint (3) to be binding while (1)
and (2) are not.
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Longer copyrights raise stars’ revenues, but this does not help increase
the number of artists since in this case (i.e., when constraint (3) is binding)
young potential artists as well as high-type artists expected revenues are
already above their opportunity costs. The problem is that young artists’
share of the audience is too small and this is limiting the possibility to
discover new talents. The increase in high-type artists’ revenues (due to
longer copyrights) raises the incentives to invest in the promotion of high-
type artists and worsens the problem: young artists’ market share is reduced.
Eventually, this will reduce high-type artistic creation because it chokes the
flow of future high-type artists. This negative eﬀect is independent of the
monopolistic distortions implied by copyrights.
4 Artistic Markets with Binding Opportunity Costs
We now consider the case where constraints (1) and (2) may be binding.
High-type artists’ opportunity cost Fh may be larger than young artists’:
Fh ≥ F y. As already discussed in the Introduction, this higher opportunity
cost may reflect two facts: first, once individual’s talent has been revealed as
high she may have better working alternatives (since artistic talent may be
positively correlated with valuable abilities at other activities); and second,
it may be optimal to combine talented work with some other general inputs
to create high-type artistic goods (those general inputs to be included in the
opportunity cost of high-type artistic creation F h).15
We go on directly to analyze symmetric steady state equilibria (aτ = a).
The analysis of high-type artists’ optimal decisions from the previous section
remains unchanged. Hence from (13) and (14) we have (per capita) high-
type artists’ revenues:
πh(T, n) = S
∙
αw(T )
n2
− 1
γ
− 1
nγ
ln
µ
βγw(T )
n2
¶¸
. (16)
Using this expression, let us consider the combinations of the copyright
term T and the number of high-type artists n satisfying constraint (1) with
equality; i.e., the set of pairs (T, n) giving rise to high-type artists’ revenues
15Talented artistic work and other inputs may be complements in the production of
movies, music, etc. We do not carry out an explicit analysis on this possibility, however,
since this would add little new to the model but some additional tedious algebra.
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equal to their opportunity costs. We denote this locus by H(T, n):
H(T, n) =:
½
(T, n) : S
∙
αw(T )
n2
− 1
γ
− 1
nγ
ln
µ
βγw(T )
n2
¶¸
= Fh
¾
. (17)
Note that a(n) = α− n2γw > 0 implies 0 > 1−
αγw
n2 > 1−
αγw
n2 +
1
2 ln(
βγw
n2 )−
(n− 1)αγwn2 = 1−
αγw
n +
1
2 ln(
βγw
n2 ). Therefore, H(n, T ) has a positive slope
in Figure 2:
dn
dw(T )
=
αγ − nw
2αγwn − 2− ln
³
βγw
n2
´ > 0.
It will be useful to define the function h : R → R as the set of pairs (T, n)
satisfying H(T, n). Thus, a pair (T, n) satisfies constraint (1) if and only if
n ≤ h(T ).
Now, let us analyze young artists’ decisions and market. From (12), de-
mand for young artists’ output is given by py = [1−
P∞
τ aτ (1− η) ητ ]S/y,
and each active young artist’s net revenues by:
πyi (yi, y) =
(1− a)Syi
y
− cyi ; i = 1, 2, ...,m.
Where yi are young artist i’s sales. Cournot equilibrium in the low-type
market gives rise to the following price and output per artist:
py =
m
m− 1c, yi =
(m− 1) (1− a)S
m2c
.
Therefore, (per capita) young artists’ revenues are
πyi =
(1− a)S
m2
. (18)
Substituting into (2’), we have a new version of young artists’ opportunity-
cost and free-entry constraint:
∙
(1− a)
m2
S
¸1−σ
+ θ
n
m
µh
πh
i1−σ
− [F y]1−σ
¶
= [F y]1−σ . (19)
Now, consider the combinations of T and n that give rise to young (low-
type) artists’ revenues equal to their opportunity costs when n = ρm. We
denote this locus by L(T, n). Substituting with (16) into (19), we have:
L(T, n) =: {(T, n) : (1 + θρ) [F y]1−σ =
∙µ
1− α
n2
+
1
γw(T )
¶
ρ2S
¸1−σ
+θρ
∙µ
αw(T )
n2
− 1
γ
− 1
nγ
ln
∙
βγw(T )
n2
¸¶
S
¸1−σ
} (20)
19
Diﬀerentiation with respect to w and n gives:
dn
dw(T )
= − n
3 + ρ2σ−1Kσθ [n− αγw]wn
2γ(1− α)w2 + ρ2σ−1Kσθ
h
2αγw − 2n− n ln(βγwn2 )
i
w2
;
where K is defined as
K =
1− α+ n2γw
αw − n2γ −
n
γ ln
³
βγw
n2
´ .
Given the rest of parameters, for ρ2σ−1θ small enough (i.e., for low probabil-
ity of becoming a star—with σ > 12— or large discount rate due, for instance,
to a long period to have the opportunity to develop and show up as a tal-
ented artist), the derivative dn/dw(T ) is negative. Therefore the L(T, n)
locus would have a negative slope as in Figure 2.16 It is convenient to define
the function l : R→ R as the set of pairs (T, n) satisfying L(T, n).
4.1 The Length of the Copyright Term
The following Lemma describes how the long run number of high-type artists
n∗ is determined as a function of the length of the copyright term T .
Lemma 3 The long run number of high-type artists n∗ is given by n∗ =
Min[l(T ), h(T )].
Proof. See Appendix A.
Solid lines in Figure 2 indicate the binding segments of l(T ) and h(T )
that determine n∗. Now, note that we may have any relative position of
H(T, n) with respect to L(T, n) along the feasible range of the copyright
term T ∈ [1,∞). In particular, we can have any of the three possible cases:
(i) H(T, n) is always above L(T, n); (ii) H(T, n) is always below L(T, n) ;
16Note that the denominator of the expression for K is given by:
n2πh/S = αw − n2/γ − n/γ ln
?
βγw/n2
?
> (α− β)w > 0;
where the inequality holds from profit maximization with respect to advertising (recall
(α− β)wS/n2 is stars’ discounted profits for zero advertising; see equation (13)). Thus,
the denominator of K is bounded away from zero. On the other hand, K is also bounded
from above by a number independent of both ρ and θ.
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and (iii) L(T, n) and H(T, n) cross each other (which is the case depicted
in Figure 2). Clearly, the consequences on artistic creation of changing the
copyright term depend on which is the case better describing a particu-
lar artistic market. This in turn depends on the importance of high-type
artists’ opportunity cost Fh relative to young artists’ opportunity cost F y,
as summarized in the following
Proposition 4 If ρ2σ−1θ is small enough (i.e., for low probability and/or
long career to become a star, with relative risk aversion σ > 1/2), the fol-
lowing properties hold:
i) If high-type artists’ opportunity cost Fh are similar to young artists’
opportunity cost F y then the long run artistic creation is decreasing in T for
T ∈ [1,∞).
ii) If high-type artists have a very high opportunity cost relative to young
artists’ opportunity the long run artistic creation is increasing in T for T ∈
[1,∞).
iii) For intermediate cases (i.e., for high-type artists’ opportunity cost
moderately larger than young artists’ opportunity cost) there exists a finite
copyright term T 0 ∈ (1,∞) that maximizes the long run number of artists,
so that this number is increasing (decreasing) in T if and only if T < T 0
(T > T 0).
Moreover, these cases can be further be characterized as follows: The
long run artistic creation is decreasing in the copyright term if high-type
artists obtain economic rents, and decreasing otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix A
Total earnings in the artistic market increase as a result of longer copy-
rights, but only high-type artists benefit from this increase. In fact, there is
also a shift of earnings from the life-period as a young artist to the uncertain
second-period event of succeeding as a star (since the raise in stars’ revenues
increase their incentives to invest in promotion). This is always positive for
the current generation of stars, but can hardly be positive for the expected
discounted utility of starting an artistic career (due to the large uncertainty
and intertemporal discount).
Extending the copyright term shrinks the market for young artists and
tends to lower their number, thereby hindering the process of developing
and uncovering young talented artists. This process reduces the number of
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high-type artists in the long run in case (i) and in case (iii) for T > T 0, since
young artists’ expected utility is the binding constraint on the long number
of high-type artists in all these cases. The result is then the same that the
one in the previous section. In the opposite case (ii), or in case (iii) as
long as T < T 0, the binding constraint on the long run number of high-type
artists is revenues accruing to them (as compared with their opportunity
costs). In these cases, extending copyrights is positive for artistic creation
in the short and in the long run. This last situation is comparable to the set-
ting assumed by the conventional approach to optimal IP protection. Note
that in these cases we have a corner solution where n∗/m∗ < ρ and longer
copyrights always increase artistic creation. Intuitively, the proportion of
talented young artists is too big given the very large opportunity costs of
creating high-type artistic goods, so that there is no room for promoting all
talented young artists into the stars’ market.
As stated in the proposition, which case holds depends on the relative
size of high-type artists’ opportunity costs with respect to young artists’
opportunity costs, which in turn depends on how specialized is talent and
other inputs used in high-type artistic creation, as argued in Section 2.
4.2 The Long Run Eﬀect of Changes in the Environment
In this subsection we consider the long run consequences on artistic creation
of changes in the environment, for any given copyright term T . In the next
subsection we analyze the normative issue of how the length of the copyright
should be changed as the environment changes, if artistic creation is to be
maximized. Thus, we will be considering the case T = T 0.
How do structural changes in the relevant environment (communication
technologies, cultural frontiers, market size, etc.) aﬀect artistic creation in
the long run? The answer happens to depend on which of the H(T, n) and
L(T, n) locuses is the relevant constraint for artistic careers. In any case,
the long run consequences on artistic creation are an indirect eﬀect of the
short run changes in market concentration by stars. When α or γ increase,
the L(T, n) schedule shifts downwards in Figure 3 and the H(T, n) schedule
shifts upwards. For T < T 0 only the shift in H(T, n) is relevant, whereas
for T > T 0 only the shift in L(T, n) is relevant. Furthermore, when market
size S increases, both schedules shift upwards. This leads to the following
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results:
Proposition 5 An increase in market size always increases the long run
number of artists. However, the impact of technological progress and eco-
nomic changes favoring artistic-market concentration, as captured by in-
creases in parameters γ and α, depend on which of the constraints on artis-
tic careers is binding. The following properties hold for ρ2σ−1θ small enough
(i.e., for low probability and/or long period to become a star, with relative
risk aversion σ > 1/2). An increase in parameter γ or α:
(i) reduces the long run number of both young artists and stars when high-
type artists’ opportunity cost Fh is similar to young artists’ opportunity cost
F yor T > T 0;
(ii) increases the long run number of both young artists and stars when
high-type artists’ opportunity cost is high enough relative to young artists’
opportunity cost or T < T 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.
As in Proposition 3, case (i) is characterized by high-type artists obtain-
ing economic rents, whereas case (ii) is characterized by high-type artists’
earnings being equal to their opportunity costs. And again, case (i) will
be the most likely case whenever artistic creation is the result of using spe-
cialized inputs. Hence when artistic creation is mostly the result of artistic
talent, technological changes favoring market concentration by superstars
will be negative for artistic creation in the long run.
4.3 The Copyright Term Maximizing Artistic Creation
As stated in Proposition 4, for intermediate values of Fh/Fl > 1 there
exists a finite copyright term T 0 > 1 that maximizes artistic creation in
the long run. In what follows we refer to T 0 as the creation-maximizing T.
This creation-maximizing copyright length is given by the intercept between
schedules H(T, n) and L(T, n). Hence shifts in these schedules would indi-
cate how the copyright term should be changed as a result of changes in the
environment, in order to maximize artistic creation.
Graphically, the eﬀect of changes in α and γ were illustrated in Figure
3. Schedule H(T, n) shifts upwards as γ or α increase, whereas schedule
L(T, n) shifts downwards. As a result the creation-maximizing copyright
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term increases when γ or α rise. On the other hand the eﬀect of an increase
in market size S is represented in Figure 4, where both H(T, n) and L(T, n)
shift upwards after an increase in S. Under our assumption that ρ is small
enough and σ > 12 , the upwards shift of H(T, n) is larger than the shift of
L(T, n) so that T 0 decreases with S. These results can be summarized in
the following
Proposition 6 Assume ρ2σ−1θ is small enough (i.e., assume becoming a
star has very low probability —with relative risk aversion σ > 1/2— or requires
a long period as a young artist). If the goal is to maximize the number of
artists in the long run, the copyright term should be reduced:
i) when communication technologies favoring market concentration by
stars improve, as captured by increases in γ and α;
ii) when market size S increases.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Interestingly, our conclusion in part (ii) of this proposition is similar to
the result by Boldrin and Levine (2006) suggesting that copyrights should be
shortened as market size increases. However, in contrast with this previous
contribution, in our model the amount of artistic creation would increase,
while in Boldrin and Levine the lower IP protection involves lower innovative
activity.
The adjustments of copyrights suggested by the proposition may be not,
however, the most likely consequence of the political economy of copyright
regulation. The reason is that the rise in stars’ expected future revenues
also increases the incentives to lobbying aimed at extending the term of
copyrights, in a similar way as it increases the incentives to spend in stars’
promotion costs.
5 Final Comments
Artistic careers are a prominent case of occupations where innate abilities
are important but cannot be ascertained without the actual job experience.
In these occupations, the number and average talent of senior professionals
is dependent on the number of juniors trying the career, many of whom may
abandon the career after updating their priors about their abilities. As a
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result of this dynamic link, even if price for senior professionals’ services in-
creases well above their current opportunity costs, their long run supply may
register little increase. The reason is that incentives for young individuals to
enter the professional career may not increase in the same proportion. This
will happen if individuals are risk averse and uncertainty about the actual
abilities is high. Superstar markets forcefully pushes up this uncertainty
since earnings concentrate in a very narrow group of successful seniors. In
this situation, any redistribution of earnings from the period as a junior
professional to the senior period contingent on success, reduces expected
utility by potential entrants in the profession thereby reducing the number
of talented senior professionals in the long run.
In this paper we have analyzed several factors that tend to shift market
shares (and revenues) in favor of stars. Whenever technological progress fa-
vors market concentration by stars it may have a negative eﬀect on artistic
creation in the long run. Extensions of the copyright term can have similar
consequences. We have characterized the situations when this will be the
case. Furthermore, changes in the economic and political environment are
now facilitating the globalization of culture, which favors further concentra-
tion of artistic markets and higher revenues accruing to superstars. In turn,
these larger revenues increase the incentives to lobby for extensions of the
copyright term. However, our analysis shows that under plausible circum-
stances there is a length of the copyright term that maximizes the long run
number of high-type artists, and that this length is decreasing in the size
of the market (as well as in the parameters capturing technological progress
favoring higher concentration in artistic markets).
Our analysis is dotted with numerous simplifications. The emphasis is
not on generality but on incorporating some relevant factors that are omitted
in the standard analysis of IP, and on discussing the likely circumstances that
may make these factors to prevail over the ones considered by the standard
analysis. We have argued that the standard analysis on IP protection is
better suited for creative activities using mostly inputs that have a high
general value (non-specialized inputs). In contrast, the standard approach
may be misleading when specific innate abilities are important for artistic
creation, and these abilities are very uncertain and only recognized after a
period of actual working as a junior artist.
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Appendix A: Proof of Propositions
Proof of Lemma 3: First note that a necessary condition for a combination
(T, n,m) to satisfy constraint (19) is n ≤ l(T ). In particular, if n = ρm we
must have n = l(T ) (since plugging n/m = ρ into (19) brings about the
L(T, n) locus). Whereas combinations (T, n,m) satisfying (19) with n < ρm
must lay below the L(T, n) locus; i.e., n < l(T ).
Consider first the case l(T ) ≤ h(T ). Hence we must have n ≤ l(T ).
But equilibrium cannot be strictly below L(T, n) either. To see this, assume
n < l(T ). Satisfying (19) would then require n < ρm. But then, (4) implies
πh = Fh; which in turn implies the point lies on the high-type opportunity
cost locus H(T, n) (i.e., n = h(T )). Hence we have a contradiction: n < l(T )
≤ h(T ) = n. We therefore conclude that for T such that l(T ) ≤ h(T ), we
have n∗ = l(T ).
Now, consider copyright terms T such that l(T ) > h(T ). Equilibria
cannot lie above any of the L(T, n) and H(T, n) locuses, hence we must
have n ≤ h(T ). But they cannot be strictly below H(T, n) either. To
see this, assume n < h(T ). But then (4) implies n = ρm; which in turn
implies the point lies on the L(T, n) locus (i.e., l(T ) = n). Hence we have a
contradiction: n < h(T ) ≤ l(T ) = n. Therefore we conclude that for T such
that l(T ) ≤ h(T ), we have n∗ = h(T ).
Proof of Proposition 4: We have the following possibilities on Fh/F y ≥
1:
i) If Fh/F y is small enough, then h(T ) > l(T ) for any T ≥ 1. There-
fore, according to Lemma 3 l(T ) determines n∗ and the statement in the
proposition follows.
To see the inequality h(T ) > l(T ) note that (20) is equivalent to
∙
πy
πh
¸1−σ
+ ρθ = (1 + ρθ)
∙
F y
πh
¸1−σ
.
So that assuming that πy < πh (a high-type artist would always fare better
than a young artist), the above expression implies F y < πh. Thus, for
Fh = F y we have F h < πh and therefore (17) is not binding. Hence h(T ) >
l(T ).By continuity, the same property holds if Fh is larger but suﬃciently
close to F y.
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ii) At the other extreme, if Fh/F y is large enough we have h(T ) < l(T )
for any T ≥ 1. Therefore, according to Lemma 3 h(T ) determines n∗.
To see this, note that the H(T, n) schedule moves to the right as F h
increases, but does not aﬀect the L(T, n) schedule. Since h(T ) is strictly
increasing and l(T ) strictly decreasing, h(T ) < l(T ) for any T ≥ 1 if and
only if h(T ) < l(T ) as T →∞. This follows from noticing that w(T )→ 1−η1−ηR
as T →∞, and that according to (19) h(T ) approaches zero as Fh goes to
infinity; whereas limT→∞l(T ) > 0. Hence given F y, for Fh large enough we
have h(T ) < l(T ) for any T ≥ 1.
iii) For intermediate values of Fh/F y, the H(T, n) and L(T, n) schedules
intersect at some strictly positive point (T 0, n0). The statement in the
proposition follows from Lemma 3 by noticing that h(T ) < l(T ) if and only
if T < T 0, while h(T ) > l(T ) if and only if T > T 0. Furthermore, the
artistic-creation maximizing policy is T = T 0.
Finally, l(T ) is the single binding constraint if and only if we are below
h(T ); which implies Fh < πh. Hence we have a negative relationship between
the copyright term and long run high-type artistic creation if and only if
high-type artists obtain positive rents. Otherwise, the positive relationship
given by h(T ) holds.
Proof of Proposition 5: We have to show that when α or γ increase,
the L(T, n) schedule shifts downwards, whereas the H(T, n) schedule shifts
upwards in Figure 3; and that when S increases, both schedules shift up-
wards. The direction of the shifts can be obtained by taking the appropriate
derivatives along the schedules L(T, n) andH(T, n) given the copyright term
T .
Let us denote by nl the level of n associated to L(T, n). From (20) we
obtain the following derivatives, for any given copyright term T :
dnl
dα
= − n− ρ
2σ−1Kσθnw(T )
2(1− α) + ρ2σ−1Kσθ
h
2αγw(T )− 2n− n ln(βγw(T )n2 )
i
/γ
;
dnl
dγ
= −
n3 − ρ2σ−1Kσθ
h
n− 1 + ln
³
γβw(T )
n2
´i
w(T )n2
2γ2(1− α)w(T ) + ρ2σ−1Kσθ
h
2αγw(T )− 2n− n ln(βγw(T )n2 )
i
w(T )γ
;
dnl
dS
=
³
1− α+ n2γw
´ h
ρ2σ
³
1−α
n2 +
1
γw
´
+ ρ2σ−1θ
³
αw
n2 −
1
γ −
1
nγ ln(
βγw
n2 )
´i
S
h
2(1− α) + 2γρ2σ−1Kσθ(1−
αγw
n +
1
2 ln
³
γβw
n2
´i .
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If ρ2σ−1Kσθ is small enough, then dnl/dα and dnl/dγ are negative, whereas
dnl/dS is positive. On the other hand, using (16), the eﬀects of α, γ, S and
n on high-type artists’ revenues are given by:
∂πhi
∂α
= S
w
n2
> 0;
∂πhi
∂γ
= S
1
γ2
∙
1− 1
n
+
1
n
ln
µ
βγw
n2
¶¸
> 0;
∂πhi
∂S
=
∙
αw
n2
− 1
γ
− 1
γn
ln
µ
βγw
n2
¶¸
> 0;
∂πhi
∂n
=
2S
n2γ
∙
1− αγw
n
+
1
2
ln
µ
βγw
n2
¶¸
< 0.
Where the sign of the last derivative follows from observing that
a(n) = α− n
2
γw
> 0
⇒ 0 > 1− αγw
n2
> 1− αγw
n2
+
1
2
ln(
βγw
n2
)− (n− 1)αγw
n2
= 1− αγw
n
+
1
2
ln(
βγw
n2
).
Let us denote by nh the level of n associated to H(T, n). From (16), (17)
and our previous results we have:
dnh
dα
= −
µ
∂πhi
∂α
/
∂πhi
∂n
¶
> 0;
dnh
dγ
= −
µ
∂πhi
∂γ
/
∂πhi
∂n
¶
> 0;
dnh
dS
= −
µ
∂πhi
∂S
/
∂πhi
∂n
¶
=
αwγ − n2 − n ln
³
βγw
n2
´
2S
h
1− αγwn +
1
2 ln
³
βγw
n2
´i > 0.
Therefore schedule H(T, n) shifts upwards when α or γ or S increase.
Proof of Proposition 6: We need to show how the artistic-creation
maximizing copyright term T 0 varies as a function of technological parame-
ters α and γ, and of the size the market S. Since both (17) and (20) hold,
the above results on dn
h
dα ,
dnh
dγ , and
dnh
dS (see proof of Proposition 5) can now
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be used to substitute into the expression for the total diﬀerentiation of (20).
Hence assuming ρ2σ−1Kσθ is small enough, we obtain:
dT 0
dα
=
−
³
∂πhi
∂n
∂nl
∂α +
∂πhi
∂α
´
³
∂πhi
∂n
∂nl
∂w +
∂πhi
∂w
´
∂w
∂T
< 0;
dT 0
dγ
=
−
³
∂πhi
∂n
dnl
dγ +
∂πhi
∂γ
´
³
∂πhi
∂n
dnl
dw +
∂πhi
∂w
´
∂w
∂T
< 0;
dT 0
dS
=
−
³
∂πhi
∂n
dnl
dS +
∂πhi
∂S
´
³
∂πhi
∂n
dnl
dw +
∂πhi
∂w
´
∂w
∂T
=
−∂π
h
i
∂n
³
dnl
dS −
dnh
dS
´
³
∂πhi
∂n
dnl
dw +
∂πhi
∂w
´
∂w
∂T
Where the last derivative is negative if and only if the following inequality
holds:
dnl
dS
/
dnh
dS
=
⎛
⎝
³
1− α+ n2γw
´ h
ρ2σ
³
1−α
n2 +
1
γw
´
+ ρ2σ−1θ
³
αw
n2 −
1
γ −
1
nγ ln(
βγw
n2 )
´i
S
h
2(1− α) + 2γρ2σ−1Kσθ(1−
αγw
n +
1
2 ln
³
γβw
n2
´i
⎞
⎠
÷
⎛
⎝
αwγ − n2 − n ln
³
βγw
n2
´
2S
h
1− αγwn +
1
2 ln
³
βγw
n2
´i
⎞
⎠
=
³
1− α+ n2γw
´ h
ρ2σ
³
1−α
n2 +
1
γw
´
+ ρ2σ−1θ
³
αw
n2 −
1
γ −
1
nγ ln
³
βγw
n2
´´i
h
1− α+ ρ2σ−1 θγKθ
³
1− αγwn +
1
2 ln
³
βγw
n2
´´i
×
h
1− αγwn +
1
2 ln
³
βγw
n2
´i
h
γαw − n2 − n ln
³
βγw
n2
´i < 1,
which is satisfied for ρ small enough, provided that σ > 1/2.
Appendix B: LowOpportunity Costs and the Young
Artists’ Minimum Audience Constraint
In Section 3 we analyzed the case when constraint (3) is the one binding; that
is, when young artists’ career is constrained by the opportunities to reach
31
the minimum audience to be uncovered as talented. Under which conditions
will this minimum audience constraint be binding instead of constraints (1)
or (2’)? In Section 3 we informally suggested that this may be the relevant
constraint for low opportunity costs. We now show this analytically.
Following inequality (3) through the analysis in Section 3 up to equation
(15) we obtain the following expression for this constraint:
n ≤
w(T )γc/ρS −
q
[w(T )γc/ρS]2 − 4 (1− α) γ
2
≡M(T ). (B.1)
According to the analysis in Section 3, this constraint has a negative slope:
∂M/∂T < 0. Now we want to show that depending on parameters, this
constraint may be below or above the H(T, n) and L(T, n) schedules.
Consider a set of parameters such that γ [w(T )c/ρS]2 = 4 (1− α). Then,
from (B.1) we have n ≤ w(T )γc/2ρS. Now, recall that the intersection of
L(T, n) and H(T, n) denoted (T 0, n0), solves (using (17) and (20)):
∙µ
1− α
(n0)2
+
1
γw(T 0)
¶
ρ2S
¸1−σ
= (1 + θρ) [F y]1−σ − θρ
h
Fh
i1−σ
.
Hence,
(n0)2 = (1− α) ρ
2Sγw(T 0)
Φ(F y, .)γw(T 0)− 1 ,
where Φ(F y, .) =
µ
(1 + θρ) [F y]1−σ − θρ
h
F h
i1−σ¶1/(1−σ)
.
Thus, for F y high enough, we have no < w(T )γc/ρS, and therefore (B.1)
is not binding. Whereas for low F y the constraint (B.1) is binding (in
particular, as Φ(F y, .) approaches 1/γw(T 0)). See Figure 5 where n02 is now
the maximum possible long run number of artists, which is obtained for a
copyright length T = T 02 (solid lines are again the binding segments of the
constraints).
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